Archive for August, 2007

“Fiction writing is not so different from brief writing.”

Monday, August 20th, 2007

That is the claim made by Profesor Kenneth Chestek at Indiana University School of Law.  In his law review article, The Plot Thickens:  The Appellate Brief as Story, Professor Chestek is not urging a departure from truth.  Instead, he urges appellate attorneys to make their briefs more interesting.  Professor Chestek argues:

“The premise for this article is that legal writing need not be—nay, should not be—boring. When we write legal briefs to a court, we are trying to resolve some human conflict. That’s inherently interesting stuff! People like to hear about what other people are doing, or what has happened to them. If something bad has happened, many people want to help out in some way. It is human nature to feel empathy for somebody caught up in a conflict, and to want the conflict to be resolved.”

In effect, Professor Chestek is urging appellate attorneys to use some of the same story-telling tools employed by good trial attorneys.  “Trial lawyers know that they have to tell their client’s story to the jury, and the story has to resonate with the jury.”

The Kids Take Precedence Over Your Choice of Defense Counsel

Monday, August 20th, 2007

Do child support determinations in California attempt to replicate the decision making of “intact” families, or do they represent some other fundamental state policy on parental obligations to children?  This is the question that occurred to me as I read the decision in Brothers v. Kern.

Brothers is on trial for capital murder.  To pay for his defense counsel, he sold his house and deposited the funds with his attorney.  Brothers was also obligated to pay child support, however, and he was behind in his obligations.  The court rejected counsel’s arguments that Brothers was now indigent, and ordered the child support obligation to be paid out of the client trust fund.

The court also rejected the argument that this order would conflict with Brothers’ constitutional right to the counsel of his choosing.  According to the court:  “The Constitution does not insulate a criminal defendant from third-party claims just because the satisfaction of those claims reduces the defendant’s ability to afford retained counsel.”

Effective Oral Argument

Monday, August 20th, 2007

California Blog of Appeal gives a link to an article that includes thoughts of a California Court of Appeal justice on how to handle oral argument.  Among the recommendations:  “You … can only guess at what may be motivating a question. … Although discerning the underlying purpose of a question may be akin sometimes to reading tea leaves, by doing so, you can focus your argument to deal with the concerns of the judges who may be unfavorably inclined toward your case.”

Appellate practitioners will want to take note.

Politics and the Law

Wednesday, August 15th, 2007

For those that still might harbor the idea that politics do not intrude on legal issues, check out this post over at The BLT.  Tony Mauro is reporting on which side of a Supreme Court case the Solicitor General has decided to support in the Stoneridge litigation after intense lobbying by all concerned.

Make Your Brief “Brief”

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

Greg May over at the California Blog of Appeal has a post discussing a subject near and dear to experienced appellate pracitioners’ hearts — deciding what arguments to axe from your brief.  Before you write your next appellate brief, you need to read “Learning How to Discard Weak Arguments.

More on Property Owner Liability

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

Deborah La Fetra, a principal attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation, is guest blogging over at Point of Law.  She has a post about the California Supreme Court decision in Castaneda v. Olsher that I talked about here.

Comment on California Only Web Pages

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

Tim Sandefur, an attorney with Pacific Legal Foundation that litigates Dormant Commerce Clause Cases, had this to say about the People ex rel. Brown v. Puritec decision that I discussed here.

Tim said:

That’s an interesting case, and I have a couple thoughts.
 
I doubt that any court would say that the DCC stands in the way of state consumer protection requirements, so long as those consumer protection requirements are reasonable. God knows, the court’s upheld plenty of unreasonable ones. Like the milk cases. See, e.g., Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105 (1999).  See also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co., 24 Cal.4th 415 (2000).
 
A couple other tangential thoughts.
In Kearney v. Solomon Smith Barney, the question was one of these personal jursidiction/choice of law things where the company was charged with violating a California law regarding telephone calls, where the company is headquartered in Georgia, and the customers originated the calls in California. I believe the case was settled before a decision. But it’s going to be increasingly problematic that states are able to reach their personal jurisdiction very far–to the full limits of Due Process (the only limit on personal jurisdiction), and that on a rational basis level. And that’s what allows this sort of thing to go on. I think we’re really going to have to re-think the way personal jurisdiction works in the internet age, and in a big way. If Due Process protects fundamental fairness, I think people would regard it as fundamentally unfair for a company doing business in another state, with a website, to be forced to redo its business just because readers can access their site from California.
 
Another thing this reminds me of is the ACLU v. Reno case, where the Court said that, in evaluating whether a law was the “least restrictive means,” they could consider the availability of private, market alternatives. That was really cool, because before then, the only thing the Court would consider when determining least restrictive means was whether the government could have done something less restrictive. But in Reno, the Court said, there is private software filtering available to consumers, and that was a less restrictive alternative to government censorship of the internet. I love that. Anyway, this case you sent seems like a sort of reverse of that. Here, the court’s imposing on businesses a requirement of redoing their website, because doing so is possible.

Can Fees Exceed Damages?

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5 does not limit the amount of attorney fees a court may award in public interest cases, and specifically recognizes the power of a court to award a “multiplier” (an augmentation to the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the reasonable hours expended in the matter).  In a recent decision, however, the Court of Appeal has signaled that trial courts should be careful about fee awards that exceed the amount of recovery.

The court in Estrada v. Fedex Ground did not issue any new rules or particular guidelines.  It did comment, however, that the trial court “[in recalculating an appropriate award on remand … must determine anew whether any multiplier is appropriate in this case” in light of both the limited success andthe fact that the fee award without the multiplier already exceeded the amount of the recovery.

The court acknowledge that it was only reviewing the trial court’s order for “abuse of discretion,” but cautioned that “the fee must above all else be reasonable.”

Further — and this is the point counsel must keep in mind in the fee applications and in drafting proposed orders awarding fees — “a multiplier, if used, must be based on facts other than those used to trigger the application of section 1021.5.”  In a footnote, the court noted that in this case “the reasons justifying any award at all and an award based on high hourly rates … were the same as those used to justify the multiplier — the benefit to the class, the risk taken, the lawyers’ skill, the excellent results.”

Condemnation on the Cheap

Friday, August 10th, 2007

Under California law, local government can condemn your property for bargain basement prices, if it was going to require you to give that property up as a condition of development approval.

Generally, when government takes property through eminent domain, it is required to pay the property owner the value of the property assuming the highest and best use.  California courts developed an exception to that rule in City of Porterville v. Young.  Under the Porterville doctrine, if the government would have required the property owner to give up the property in question as a condition to approval of a development approval, then the property is not valued at its highest and best use in an eminent domain proceeding.  Instead, the property is only valued in its undeveloped state.  The only thing that the government needs to establish to take advantage of the price discount is that the dedication requirement is constitutional.
 
Under a recent decision by the court of appeal, however, that is not a very significant hurdle for governments looking to build highway projects.

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Appearance of Impropriety in Adminsitrative Hearing Triggers Due Process

Thursday, August 9th, 2007

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Board

Nonattorneys are often surprised that adminsitrative agencies serve as both prosecutor and judge in an administrative hearing.  But what happens when the “prosecutor” is also the legal adviser for the “judge”?  Picture the District Attorney in your criminal case acting as the research attorney for your judge for other prosecutions!!

 

California’s Third District Court of Appeal ruled (Justice Butz wrote the opinion in which Presiding Justice Scotland joined) that Morongo’s due process rights were violated because the state attorney prosecuting Morongo before the Water Board was serving at the same time as a legal adviser to the Board in a different case.  The court’s ruling clearly holds that a showing of actual bias is not required.  Instead, due process is violated where there is an appearance of impropriety.

 

The Water Board’s practice was described in Justice Robie’s dissent: 

“In a water right enforcement proceeding (such as the proposed revocation of a license under Water Code section 1675), the Board assigns some members of its staff to serve on an “enforcement team” — the role of which is to appear before the Board as a party — and other members of its staff to serve on a “hearing team” — the role of which is to assist Board members in conducting the hearing and formulating a decision.  A separate attorney is assigned to each team.  Members of the enforcement team are screened from inappropriate contact with members of the Board and members of the hearing team by application of the rules against ex parte communications contained in the administrative adjudication provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 11430.10-11430.80.)”

The panel majority found these two roles for an attorney “ethically incompatible,” and rejected the Water Board’s complaint that it did not have the funding necessary to separate their staff permanently.  “We refuse to adjust the minimum standards of due process to accommodate the Water Board’s asserted budgetary restraints.”

This decision may well have a significant impact on the operation of a number of administrative agencies in California, and thus it is a likely candidate for Supreme Court review.  One interesting point in the decision is the Court of Appeal’s citation to a denial of review in a prior case (Quintero v. City of Santa Ana (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 810) as a signal that the Supreme Court “is comfortable” with the rationale employed in this decision.  The Court also emphasized that review was denied in that case notwithstanding an amicus letter from the Attorney General urging review.