Archive for October, 2007

Appellant rescued from procedural snafus

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2007

The Court of Appeal appears to have rescued the appellant in County of Orange v. Superior Court from a couple of potentially fatal procedural miscues.  First, the appellant sought to stay the judgment of the superior court pending appeal by filing a “petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.”.  The court comes to the rescue, noting:  “We treated the Department’s petition as a petition for writ of supersedeas, and, on our own motion, granted the Department’s request for an immediate stay of the proceedings.”

Generally, supersedeas is the appropriate procedure to get a stay of the trial court judgment pending appeal.  The purpose of the writ is to suspend the trial court’s authority to enforce the judgment and thus preserve the jurisdiction of the appellate court to hear the matter.  Without the writ, the case may become moot.

In this case, the court also appears to have rescued the appellant on another issue.  According to real party, the order at issue is not appealable.  The Court of Appeal did not rule on that assertion and instead exercised its “discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.”

This raises an interesting question with regard to conversion of the first writ into a writ of supersedeas.  As noted above, the purpose of that writ is to preserve the court’s appellate jurisdiction (Cal Rule of Court 8.112; CCP § 923).  If the court was going to treat the matter as a petition for writ of mandate in the end, was it necessary to convert the first writ into a writ of supersedeas?  Does this give the real party grounds to argue that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting that writ and the immediate stay?

Self-inflicted wounds do not grant standing to sue

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2007

Purchasing a product in order to pursue litigation against the manufacturer is not sufficient to establish standing under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus & Prof Code §17200) according to a recent Court of Appeal decision.

The plaintiff, executive director of the Women’s Law Center, filed a declaration in the case stating that she purchased the skin cream both as a consumer and in order to determine the truth of the manufacturers claims.  Since she did not actually rely on any of the manufacturers claims, the court ruled that she could not pursue the claim under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code §1750) or under fraud or misrepresentation theories.

Analyzing the §17200 claim, the court noted that voters had recently adopted Proposition 64 to restrict claims under that law to individuals who have suffered “injury in fact” and who have lost money as a result of the unfair competition.  As the court noted, voters expressly imported the federal standing requirement into claims under §17200.

Standing issues are often conceptually difficult in state law.  In federal court, standing relates to jurisdiction — the court’s power to hear the claim under the constitution.  Federal courts have limited jurisdiction under the Constitution to hear only “cases or controversies,” a requirement that is enforced through the standing requirement.

State courts do not operate under such a limitation, however.  In California, standing is treated as an element of the cause of action.  Like the jurisdictional standing requirement in federal courts, however, it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.  Thus, in some instances, it seems to be a jurisdictional requirement and California courts will often look to federal authorities to determine questions of standing.  Nonetheless, the two concepts are very distinct as shown by the state’s treatment of taxpayer actions.